This paper tests the rational ignorance hypothesis by Downs (1957) . This theory predicts that people do not acquire costly information to educate their votes. We provide new estimates for the e¤ect of voting participation by exploring the Brazilian dual voting system -voluntary and compulsory -whose exposure is determined by citizens'date of birth. Using a fuzzy RD approach and data from a self-collected survey, we …nd no impact of voting on individuals'political knowledge or information consumption. Our results corroborate Downs's predictions and refute the conjecture by Lijphart (1997) that compulsory voting stimulates civic education.
Introduction
It is a well documented fact that the American electorate is poorly informed about politics. As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) remark, during the 1992 US Election, only 15% of voters knew that George Bush and Dan Quayle (Republican candidates at that time) favored the death penalty, and only 5% knew that these candidates had proposed cuts in the capital gains tax. Similarly, in a recent survey, nearly half of the respondents incorrectly a¢ rmed that the Troubled Asset Relief Program was signed into law by President Barack Obama (Pew Research Center, 2010) .
This feature of the constituency is in line with predictions of the rational voters' theory and with the "rational ignorance" hypothesis proposed by Downs (1957) . Voters recognize that, in large elections, their ballots have a vanishingly small chance of being decisive. Therefore, regardless of how much they may care about election results, they dedicate little or no e¤ort to acquire information to make educated votes. This result is central in political economy. Yet it is striking and at odds with predictions from recent alternative theories of voting behavior (Feddersen and Sandroni 2006a, Degan 2006) .
To provide an answer for whether people acquire information to vote, and a result for the dispute above, we explore the Brazilian dual voting legislation. Those who are between 16 and 18 years old are entitled (but not obliged) to vote, while those older than 18 are legally required to turn out. 1 This legislation provides an exogenous shift in an individual's likelihood to vote, which is used to identify the causal e¤ects. We explore the discontinuity in voting participation at the age of eighteen to test if individuals become more knowledgeable once they must vote. The data comes from a survey we conducted on the week following the 2010 Presidential Election. We collected information from 5,562 individuals with ages near the threshold determining the transition from voluntary to compulsory voting legislation. This paper makes two important contributions. First, we test the validity of the rational ignorance hypothesis. In doing so, our analysis o¤ers signi…cant advantages with respect to many other studies on the voting e¤ects on real-life elections. 2 Our data was collected just a few days after the election. Hence, we are able to access individuals'knowledge and information levels as they prepare to vote. Also, our identi…cation strategy is quite compelling, as the compulsory legislation provides a powerful instrument which we use in our IV analysis outlined in Section III. Turnout in our sample is close to 30-60% higher among individuals "just exposed"to compulsory voting then among those "just about to"be included under this system. Worth mentioning is that aggregated turnout rates in our data are very much in line with those observed for the Brazilian population. To our knowledge, this paper is the …rst to estimate the contemporaneous e¤ects of voting participation on political knowledge and information acquisition using data from a large-scale election under real-world incentives. Moreover, by exploiting the dual voting system, this paper contributes to the discussion about the merits of the compulsory electoral system, currently in place in 14% of countries. An important argument in favor of this policy is that it entices the population to be more politically engaged, as advocated by Lijphart (1997) . Our second contribution is the evaluation of this point. 3 It is clear, from the RD graphical analysis, that the increase in turnout, as a consequence of the compulsory voting legislation, is not followed by an increase in political knowledge among the population. This supports our IV results, which show no statistically signi…cant e¤ect of voting participation on making individuals more knowledgeable and more likely to acquire information. These …ndings are robust to various econometric speci…cations and di¤erent measures of information acquisition. Furthermore, we …nd no di¤erences by race, gender, mother's education and mother's political a¢ liation, demonstrating that heterogeneous e¤ects by groups with arguably di¤erent incentives to acquire information are not masking any voting e¤ect.
Our results show that, at least for the forced voters, which in Brazil are more than a third of the number of voluntary voters, the consumption of political information comes from reasons other than getting ready to vote (e.g. interest in politics, having informal discussions with friends). This …nding is in line with Downs's (1957) hypothesis and with predictions from economic models of strategic voting (Martinelli 2006 (Martinelli , 2007 .
To provide an answer for whether people acquire information to vote, and a result for the dispute above, we explore the Brazilian dual voting legislation. Those who are between 16 and 18 years old are entitled (but not obliged) to vote, while those older than 18 are legally required to turn out. 4 This legislation provides an exogenous shift in an individual's likelihood to vote, which is used to identify the causal e¤ects. We explore the discontinuity in voting participation at the age of eighteen to test if individuals become more knowledgeable once they must vote. The data comes from a survey we conducted on the week following the 2010 Presidential Election. We collected information from 5,562 individuals with ages near the threshold determining the transition from voluntary to compulsory voting legislation. This paper makes two important contributions. First, we test the validity of the rational ignorance hypothesis. In doing so, our analysis o¤ers signi…cant advantages with respect to many other studies on the voting e¤ects on real-life elections. 5 Our data was collected just a few days after the election. Hence, we are able to access individuals'knowledge and information levels as they prepare to vote. Also, our identi…cation strategy is quite compelling, as the compulsory legislation provides a powerful instrument which we use in our IV analysis outlined in Section III. Turnout in our sample is close to 30-60% higher among individuals "just exposed"to compulsory voting then among those "just about to"be included under this system. Worth mentioning is that aggregated turnout rates in our data are very much in line with those observed for the Brazilian population. To our knowledge, this paper is the …rst to estimate the contemporaneous e¤ects of voting participation on political knowledge and information acquisition using data from a large-scale election under real-world incentives. Moreover, by exploiting the dual voting system, this paper contributes to the discussion about the merits of the compulsory electoral system, currently in place in 14% of countries. An important argument in favor of this policy is that it entices the population to be more politically engaged, as advocated by Lijphart (1997) . Our second contribution is the evaluation 4 The voting enforcement mechanism is explained in Section II.A. 5 For excellent reviews, see Michelson and Nickerson (2011) and Merlo (2006.) 4 of this point. 6 It is clear, from the RD graphical analysis, that the increase in turnout, as a consequence of the compulsory voting legislation, is not followed by an increase in political knowledge among the population. This supports our IV results, which show no statistically signi…cant e¤ect of voting participation on making individuals more knowledgeable and more likely to acquire information. These …ndings are robust to various econometric speci…cations and di¤erent measures of information acquisition. Furthermore, we …nd no di¤erences by race, gender, mother's education and mother's political a¢ liation, demonstrating that heterogeneous e¤ects by groups with arguably di¤erent incentives to acquire information are not masking any voting e¤ect.
Our results show that, at least for the forced voters, which in Brazil are more than a third of the number of voluntary voters, the consumption of political information comes from reasons other than getting ready to vote (e.g. interest in politics, having informal discussions with friends). This …nding is in line with Downs's (1957) hypothesis and with predictions from economic models of strategic voting (Martinelli 2006 (Martinelli , 2007 . This paper proceeds in six sections. In Section 2, we explain the rational ignorance hypothesis, competing theories and our contribution with respect to previous empirical work. In Section 3, we describe Brazilian electoral institutions and the data. In Section 4, we discuss our empirical strategy. We present the results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Rational Ignorance Hypothesis and Evidence
The rational ignorance hypothesis was formulated by Anthony Downs in 1957 in his seminal work, "An Economic Theory of Democracy."The reasoning develops as follows. Voters are uncertain about candidates and face a cost for acquiring information to help them to make a better voting decision. A rational voter knows that, in a large election, the chance that his vote will make a di¤erence (or be pivotal) is practically zero, hence it is pointless to acquire information. Cesar Martinelli (2006 Martinelli ( , 2007 Degan (2006) explains the process of information acquisition and voting turnout in a setting in which individuals face uncertainty about candidates' policy positions, and assuming that citizens compare the exogenous and intrinsic bene…t of voting to the cost of making a mistake (i.e. of voting for someone that may not be the preferred candidate). This cost in turn can be attenuated with costly information acquisition. 9 Degan's model also predicts heterogeneous e¤ects: middle-of-the-road or independents are more likely to acquire information than partisans are. This is because partisans are less likely to make an uninformed mis- 7 The pivotal conjecture is, by no means, obvious. No large election in American history has been decided by one single vote, and still millions of citizens do turn out to vote. At least in part, this fact motivated other non-pivotal vote models, and they prove to be a good representation of turnout reality ( voting costs below this threshold should vote for their preferred candidate. 9 Degan and Merlo (2011) interpret this cost as a psychological discomfort faced with the possibility of making a mistake, like self-blame for perhaps making an unwise voting choice.
take (e.g. a left-wing person is less likely than a moderate to vote erroneously for a Democrat). From the empirical perspective, the question of whether people acquire information in order to vote is unsettled. No doubt, that is at least partially due to the di¢ culty to (randomly) allocate people to the conditions of "voters"and "non-voters". 10 Similarly to this study, some previous works look at the relationship between compulsory voting and information. The evidence is mixed; some …nd a positive correlation based on cross-country comparisons (Gordon and Segura 1997, Berggren 2001 ). In conducting elections in the laboratory, Seebauer and Grober (2013) …nd that participants become signi…cantly more likely to acquire costly information when assigned to compulsory elections than to voluntary ones. On the other hand, in a …eld experiment from Canada, Loewen, Milner and Hicks (2008) , no association is found. They requested that a group of participants vote in order to receive a monetary reward, and they …nd no statistically signi…cant e¤ect of their intervention on individuals' media consumption or political knowledge. Although relevant, these studies face important limitations in testing the rational ignorance hypothesis. Elections conducted in the lab involve few participants (3 to 7), failing to account for the realism of large elections (e.g. a negligible chance of a single vote determining the election result). Cross-country comparisons may carry biases due to correlations between electoral system and electorate preferences (e.g. di¤erences in political culture or politicians running for o¢ ce), and …eld experiments have a limited impact in inducing voting participation and hence in testing this hypothesis. 11 Using data on real-life elections, within a country and an RD approach, we are able to quantify 10 Main identi…cation strategies include …eld-experiments inducing voting participation (in many studies by Alan Gerber, Donald Green and co-authors), comparisons across individuals based on voting eligibility status or across individuals assigned to di¤erent voting systems. The latter category, as discussed above, investigates the association between exposure to compulsory voting legislation and political information. 3 Background and Data
Brazilian Electoral System
Mandatory voting was introduced in Brazil in 1932, when the country's …rst Electoral Code was created after the Revolution of 1930. The electoral legislation was subsequently changed several times throughout the politically turbulent period that followed until 1988. 12 In that year, the current Brazilian Constitution was promulgated, adopting compulsory voting for literate individuals between 18 and 69 years old and voluntary voting for citizens who are illiterate, 70 years or older, or between 16 and 18 years old (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE). Democratic elections are currently held every second year in Brazil. All voters must register; when individuals who are required to vote fail to do so and fail to provide justi…cation to the electoral authority, they must pay a small …ne. 13 Stronger sanctions are applied to those who fail to justify their absence for three consecutive elections; they are not allowed to issue or renew their passports and national identity cards and also become ineligible for public education, public jobs, cash transfer programs and credit by …nancial institutions maintained by the government. The legal requirement refers to showing up at the polls and the option of providing a justi…cation for failing to vote is available, but not commonly used. According to records from the TSE, in the 2010 Presidential Elections, 82% of the total electorate opted to turn up at the polls.
14 O¢ cial records only give information about voting turnout at the aggregate level. An analysis like this one demands a survey collection. This took place just after the …rst round of the 2010 Presidential Elections. At that time, there were three main candidates running for election: Jose Serra, Marina Silva and Dilma Rousse¤.
Data
To exploit the dual voting system, we conducted our survey aiming to interview individuals near the threshold of 18 years old. We surveyed 5,562 students in 109 classrooms from October 4-7, 2010. Since the data collection occurred immediately after Election Day (October 3), we believe responses e¤ectively re ‡ect outcomes in preparation to vote.
The same procedure was applied across all classrooms: an interviewer entered the room about 15 minutes before the end of a class, read an introductory script, and distributed the survey to all students. 15 The survey consisted of a comprehensive set of questions about demographics, vote, media consumption and a political quiz to evaluate respondents'levels of political knowledge. In the paper, we use all outcomes related to information acquisition available in our survey. A list and description of all variables used and the political quiz are in the Web Appendix.
Respondents were told they were allowed to skip any question, but the vast majority responded to most questions and declared to have answered the survey in a serious manner. 16 These high rates of participation and the quality of response are probably a result from the teachers'request for collaboration. The sample includes students in three types of institutions: public high schools, a preparatory school for college admission and a large university, all in the city of São Paulo, Brazil. 17 The …rst subsample includes seniors from three public schools: Escola Estadual Professor Ascendino Reis, Escola Estadual Rui Bloem and Escola Estadual Professor Leopoldo Santana. The second is composed of students taking a preparatory course for college admission exams at Anglo Vestibulares. These are mostly high school seniors or students who recently …nished high school but have not yet been admitted into college. The last subsample consists of freshmen from Universidade de São Paulo 15 Four types of questionnaires, containing exactly the same questions but in di¤erent orders, were randomly distributed to students in order to prevent cheating. Participants were not informed about the precise purpose of the survey, which was entitled, "Young Adults'Political Behavior," and associated with the Universidade de São Paulo (USP). 16 More precisely, 93% of them declared to have answered the survey in a serious manner, and 80.25% of participants answered more than 80% of the questions. Another indication that subjects were incentivized included the facts that only 2.36% of participants abstained from answering open questions from the political quiz. Also, only 1.26% of the students abstained from answering the voting-sensitive question (whether they had voted and for whom). Merely 0.27% chose the unrevealing alternative "I do not know" as opposed to stating a vote choice. 17 São Paulo is the largest metropolis in Brazil and among the cities with the highest income per capita in the country.
(USP). Anglo and USP students are older and more a-uent than public high school students. These di¤erences are relevant, leading to a correlation between age and socioeconomic characteristics in the pooled sample. For this reason, our analysis is conducted exploring variation within schools. Our analysis is mostly focused on 3,236 students who are close enough to the cuto¤. These are individuals between 16.75 and 19.25 years old (i.e. within more or less 15 months from the threshold by the 2010 Election Day). 18 Table A1 in the Web Appendix describes the socioeconomic characteristics and outcomes of this sample. Approximately 77% are white, and 59% are females. Most of them live with their parents (86%) and have a mother with some college education (67%). Sixty seven percent are Anglo students. Twenty one percent are public schools students and eleven percent are college (USP) students.
In terms of voting participation, approximately 72% of them declared to have voted in the 2010 Election. Voter over-reporting is a recognized issue in surveys (Anderson and Silver 1986 ). To investigate whether it is present in our data, we compare self-reported turnout in our sample and o¢ cial rates in the country in Table 1 . The resemblance is much closer than typically reported in international surveys in the US or the UK. over-reporting occurs around the 18-year cuto¤ or that it happens disproportionally on the right side of the cuto¤. Overall, students in our sample are quite aware of their voting requirement status, as shown in Table A1 , and they may feel more uneasy about declaring abstention if they know they have to vote. This could a¤ect our conclusions, leading to a false inference of null voting e¤ects (since a change in behavior is not expected unless a real change in voting participation occurs). We …nd evidence for this subsample in line with the fact that students are being sincere about their vote responses. The results are reported in Table A2 in the Web Appendix. They show consistency between participants'voting responses and the retrospective reported turnout of their older peers. 20 Furthermore, none of our results change when we conduct the analysis using reported registration status instead of participation.
Empirical Strategy and Threats to Identi…cation
We test the prediction that voting participation does not make people more likely to acquire information and become more knowledgeable about politics. To identify voting e¤ects, we perform instrumental variable regressions using the discontinuity generated by the exposure to the compulsory electoral system as an instrument for voting participation. This corresponds to a Fuzzy RD design. We estimate the following equations:
Second Stage:
In these equations, Y i represents the outcome of individual i; X i contains a number of covariates, are school …xed e¤ects 21 , 1(age>18) is a dummy indicating whether the student had turned 18 by the 2010 election, H(age) is a lower order polynomial in age (measured by the distance in days to the 18th birthday) that is ‡exible on each side of the cuto¤, and $ i and i are error terms.
Before presenting the results, we discuss the validity of this approach. We assume that, conditional on age, the instrument is not correlated with students'characteristics that could independently in ‡uence their political outcome. This assumption cannot be entirely veri…able; however, it can easily be rejected. As discussed by Lee and Lemieux (2010) , a simple test is to …t regressions for possible confounding variables and test for jumps at the age of 18. We estimate (3) using several covariates, such as demographic characteristics (X i ), as the endogenous variable. Table 2 shows the results. Coe¢ cients are not statistically signi…cant for most of the variables, including demographics and family characteristics. 22 One relevant exception is previous voting experience. The 2010 election was the …rst opportunity for all respondents in this sample to vote in a presidential election; nonetheless, participants older than 18 had the opportunity to vote in the 2008 local elections. The predicted fraction of second-time voters on the right side of the threshold is between 4-6 percentage points higher than on its left side. Considering that local elections do not receive as much attention as presidential ones and that the fraction of second-time voters is small in comparison to the change in turnout (approximately 1/5) instills con…dence that this is not a relevant confounding factor. In addition, in our main analysis, we conduct regressions controlling for this characteristic.
T able2
Another potential threat lies in the fact that e¤ects are identi…ed at the age of 18, when youngsters reach the age of legal majority. We obviously accept that new opportunities and responsibilities which become available might change individuals, but this happens gradually and not abruptly at the 18th birthday. We tested whether students changed their behavior regarding their propensity to apply for college admission exams or to respond seriously to the survey at the threshold. In line with our expectations, none of these changed (Table 2) .
Finally, there is the issue of self-reported data. This can result in non-random sorting across the threshold (i.e. the choice to participate in the survey correlates with participation in the election). In this case, a jump in the number of observations around the age of eighteen would be observed. Figure A1 in the Web Appendix shows a plot of the number of observations by age. The density of this variable at the threshold is smooth, and a formal test (based on McCrary, 2008) fails to reject the null hypothesis of no discontinuity at the cut-o¤ point at the 86.17% level of signi…cance. 23 
Results
In this section, we show IV estimates for the e¤ect of voting on political knowledge and several measures of information acquisition. We …nd no statistically signi…cant impact for any variable. Then we examine whether there are heterogeneous e¤ects of voting on political knowledge across several subgroups and …nd no evidence of any statistically signi…cant impact. Worth note is that, in using an instrumental variable approach, we estimate local average treatment e¤ects. This method estimates the average treatment e¤ect for compliers, or individuals who change their treatment status (i.e. become voters), because they react to the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) . This is the population of forced voters. In interpreting a (non-) reaction, it is important to consider the fact that most of the adult Brazilian population votes. This probably elicits some peer pressure in inducing people to vote before turning eighteen (or vote voluntarily). Hence, in the context of a dual voting system, it is possible that these e¤ects are estimated for a population less willing to be engaged in politics than an average non-voter in a single voting system, like in the U.S. 24 Overall, our …ndings indicate that, when forced to vote, the population does not react by acquiring information and 23 We also …nd no signi…cant discontinuities in the distribution of observations in each of the subgroups considered in Section IV B. 24 Although we can only identify e¤ects among forced voters ("compliers"), and not for voluntary ones ("always takers"), our …ndings may be more general. As will be shown in Figure 1 , there is a strong increase in the fraction of voters among the 17-year old population, possibly due to reasons related to the compulsory legislation like peer e¤ects or anticipation to the obligation to vote, with no respective increase in political knowledge.
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becoming more knowledgeable about politics. Figure 1 illustrates the intuition for the result that people do not acquire costly information to vote. It plots the average outcome residual values in a 12-day interval. Residuals are obtained by regressing outcome on school-…xed e¤ects, an indicator for whether the participant voted before and demographic characteristics (mother's education, gender and race indicators). Hollow circles indicate values for voter participation, and black circles represent the level of political knowledge (measured by the proportion of correct answers in the political quiz). For ease of visualization, we include predicted lines based on local linear regressions using a rectangular kernel and a bandwidth of nine months on each side of the cuto¤.
E¤ects of Voting on Political Information
While the exposure to compulsory voting has a clear and large impact in increasing voting turnout, a similar pattern is not visible for knowledge about politics; in fact, this variable's plot is close to a ‡at line throughout the age domain. The null voting e¤ect is then straightforward, as the implied IV estimate of the causal e¤ect is the ratio of the estimated discontinuity in knowledge at age eighteen to the estimated discontinuity in turnout.
F igure1
Next, we turn to our parametric estimates for the impact of voting participation. We use lower-order age polynomials based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) of model selection. 25 They also present a better …t of the data, based on root-mean-square errors and R-square criterion. In spite of this, all …ndings hold when we use higher-order polynomials. In terms of the sample, we present results for individuals between 16.75 and 19.25 years old (within …fteen months of the cuto¤ age). We …nd the same results when further restricting the sample for individuals within six months of the age they are legally required to vote, or using all observations collected in the survey, including individuals between 16 and 60 years old (these results are available upon request). Before turning to our main …ndings, we comment on our …rst-stage results. The estimated coe¢ cients for the e¤ect of the exposure to compulsory voting on voting participation are consistent with the impression from Figure 1 . They indicate that, at 25 We also run regressions for speci…cations including higher-order polynomials and a set of 30-day bin dummies, and these indicators are not jointly statistically signi…cant, suggesting that these polynomials are an over…t of the data (Lee and Lemieux 2010). the age of eighteen, there is a signi…cant increase in the probability of voting turnout, roughly between 30-60% (or between 15 and 27 percentage-points), depending on the speci…cation and sample. These results are reported in the Web Appendix in Table  A3 . In all regressions, the estimates for the eighteenth birthday coe¢ cient are highly signi…cant (related t-statistics are always greater than 2) and F-statistics are high. These …ndings support our identi…cation strategy and demonstrate the strength of our instrument.
In Table 3 , we describe results of the impact of voting on performance in the political quiz. We begin showing, in the …rst two columns, OLS estimates to examine the correlation between political knowledge and voting participation. In column 1, we control for a quadratic age polynomial ‡exible on each side of the threshold and demographic controls. The estimated voting coe¢ cient implies that voters score 0.073 percentage points higher than non-voters in the political quiz. In the second column, we replicate controls in the …rst row, but use a linear polynomial in age ‡exible on each side of the threshold. We …nd practically the same point estimate for the voting coe¢ cient. Taking into consideration the average performance of the population younger than 18 (described at the bottom of Table 3 ), these estimates indicate that voters perform roughly 15% better than non-voters in the political quiz. Column 3 presents the IV results for a speci…cation controlling for demographics and using a quadratic age polynomial. The coe¢ cient for the e¤ect of voting is not statistically signi…cant, and it is close to zero. The result does not change when we exclude demographic controls (column 4) or when we control for a polynomial linear in age (column 5). In columns 6 and 7, we show the results when narrowing the sample to individuals between 17.5 and 18.5 (within 6 months of the cuto¤) or individuals between 17.75 and 18.25 (within three months of the cuto¤) and replicating controls from column 5. For these regressions, the voting coe¢ cients drop signi…cantly, becoming negative, but they are, again, non-statistically signi…cant. As noted, the voting coe¢ cient in Table 3 is centered on zero for most speci…cations using the larger sample. However, standard errors are moderately large. Focusing on the speci…cation in column 5, the estimates on the voting coe¢ cient and respective standard error imply a ninety-…ve percent con…dence level, roughly between -0.093 and 0.098.
T able3
In any case, we also test for other knowledge variables, isolating in the quiz individuals'knowledge about candidates'party a¢ liation, policies implemented by candidates, and comprehension of the ideological political spectrum. We do not …nd statistically signi…cant e¤ects of voting in determining these variables, as also shown in Table A4 in the Web Appendix. Overall, the estimates in Tables 3 and A4 largely corroborate null voting e¤ects on political knowledge.
In Table 4 , we present the IV results using several self-reported mechanisms of information acquisition as dependent variables, focusing on the main sample and on the speci…cation controlling for full controls and a linear polynomial in age. The outcomes shown at the top of Table 4 include the following variables: whether participants always read the politics section in newspapers, the frequency with which they follow politics on newspapers and magazines, and the frequency with which they discuss politics with friends and parents. 26 At the bottom of Table 4 , we present estimates for the e¤ects of voting participation on the frequency at which individuals consumed political information during the 2010 electoral season in TV news, on the Internet, and through presidential debates and TV campaign ads. 27 We do not detect a statistically signi…cant e¤ect of voting for any outcomes. In IV regressions not presented in the paper, we …nd the same results restricting the sample to individuals within six or three months of the age cuto¤.
T able4
Of note, some of the IV estimates are fairly noisy, and lack of precision might jeopardize our conclusions. To provide extra evidence of non-existent voting impacts, we turn to the e¤ect of compulsory voting by showing the reduced form for the e¤ect of whether the individual is 18 or older on Election Day. We conduct regressions considering di¤erent control speci…cations and samples. The results for all outcomes in this study are presented in Table A5 , columns 1-4, in the Web Appendix. Overall, these coe¢ cients are more precisely estimated than the voting impact in the IV regressions is. They largely indicate non-statistically signi…cant e¤ects of compulsory voting on information acquisition. In line with these RD regressions, non-parametric tests also detect no di¤erence in behaviour by those that turn eighteen just before or just after 26 These were multiple-choice questions in which students were presented with four alternatives about the frequency of discussion: (a) never, (b) rarely, (c) often, and (d) very often. We rank those in a 4-point scale, ranging from (a) to (d), and normalize these variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 27 The frequency of following politics in newspapers, TV news or the internet refers to the number of days per week. Presidential debates and TV campaigns refers to the total number of times watched during the electoral season.
Election Day. We follow Hanh, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) and Porter (2003) and take the di¤erence at the boundary points of two local linear regressions using a rectangular kernel and checking for several bandwidths (as recommended by Lee and Lemieux 2010) . Following the literature, we estimate asymptotic standard errors using the formula from Porter (2003) . 28 Graphical evidence is presented in Figure 2 , and the regression results are shown in Table A5 , columns 5-7, in the online Appendix. The estimated discontinuity coe¢ cients indicate the absence of a voting e¤ect on all outcomes except for the number of TV political campaigns watched during the electoral season, signi…cant at the 10% level for a bandwidth of six months. According to this speci…cation, the exposure to compulsory voting leads to an increase between one and two watched programs in the electoral season. Worth note is that these political slots are broadcasted on prime-time of free TV channels, 29 and hence are a source of political information for which citizens do not have to search actively. They also do not contribute to an increase in knowledge, as shown above.
F igures2

Heterogeneity of Voting E¤ects on Political Knowledge
Next, we check whether the results for the impact of voting on knowledge in the pooled sample are masking di¤erent impacts across subgroups in the population. In reasoning why heterogeneous e¤ects can be relevant, we consider the political background at that time. By 2010, the incumbent president, Lula, had been in power for eight years, having implemented many social policies aimed at reducing inequality in the country. 30 Poverty and unemployment rates decreased substantially (Musacchio 2008) , and the media credited candidate Dilma Rousse¤'s popularity to Lula's legacy 28 We thank Douglas Miller for providing the code from Ludwig and Miller (2007) . 29 In Brazil, the electoral law stipulates that, 45 days before the election, television networks must allocate two 50-minute slots of their grids per day to political campaign advertising (TSE). In total, nearly 180 political ads were broadcasted during the 2010 electoral season. 30 These include the increase in the minimum wage to its highest level in real terms since 1979
and a signi…cant expansion of the coverage of the Bolsa Familia Program. This program currently provides cash to approximately 12 million bene…ciaries. The scheme is such that the government provides families earning less than $60 per month a cash transfer that varies between U$7 and US$40, depending on income level. In exchange, the bene…ciaries commit to keeping their children in school and receiving regular medical visits and vaccinations at home.
(she was his chosen successor), especially among lower-income individuals. In addition, this group faces a higher cost in acquiring information. 31 From this perspective, lower-income participants -in this paper's case, students with a mother with no college education -are expected to be less likely to acquire information to vote. In Table 5 , we present IV estimates for voting e¤ects across several subgroups. We do not detect impacts by mother education, race or gender (columns 2-9). Coe¢ cients are not statistically signi…cant, and a formal chi-square test does not reject the hypothesis of equality of coe¢ cients for any group (bottom row). We also separate groups by whether the individuals'mother has a party preference (as reported by the participant). This variable is used as a proxy for individuals'location in a political spectrum, since in our sample, a student whose mother prefers a particular party is less likely to be centeroriented (or middle of the road). 32 Although this is a noisy and perhaps endogenous measure for ideology, this characteristic is key in explaining information acquisition in voting models (Degan 2006, Feddersen and Sandroni 2006a) . Again, the related coe¢ cients in columns 8 and 9 are not statistically signi…cant. Overall, the consistency and robustness of estimates for the impact voting, considering distinct speci…cations, samples and variables, leads to the conclusion that voting participation does not have a contemporaneous e¤ect on information acquisition.
T able5
Conclusion
This paper presents evidence consistent with the rational ignorance hypotheses, tested in the context of compulsory voting. We do not …nd any e¤ect of voting on information acquisition. Our results show that, at least for the forced voters -which in Brazil are more than a third of the number of voluntary voters 33 -the consumption of political information comes from other reasons than getting ready to vote (e.g. interest in politics, having informal discussion with friends). This …nding is in line with the hypothesis presented by Downs (1957) and with 31 For example, among lower-income classes (households whose monthly income is lower than 3 minimum salaries), 11% have a computer with access to Internet at home, and 76% have a radio. These rates are 51% and 86%, respectively, for the remainder of the population (IBGE). 32 This correlation is also observed the literature (Settle, Dawes and Fowler 2009) . 33 This number is based on our estimates, presented in Table A3 , and the fact that close to 37% of those younger than 18 vote.
predictions from economic models of strategic voting (Martinelli 2006 (Martinelli , 2007 ). Downs's framework emphasizes the instrumental value of voting, which is often questioned as a suitable explanation for understanding participation in large elections (Feddersen 2004 , Borgers 2004 ). On the other hand, it seems consistent with our perhaps surprising results of people's decision not to educate their votes. Our …ndings contrast with the well-established result related to the reverse causality of information on voting (Lassen 2005, Gentzkow 2006, Banerjee et al. 2010 ). For example, in a …eld experiment in India, Banerjee, Kumar, Pande and Su (2010) found that, in receiving information about candidates'quali…cations and legislators'performance, people became more likely to vote. Information can change people's preferences, trigger their interest in politics and a¤ect their participation in elections. 34 In this paper, we …nd that forcing people to vote is a much less powerful incentive to induce involvement in politics than providing information to citizens. Our results also refute an argument advocated by Lijphart (1997, p. 10) regarding the bene…ts of compulsory voting, namely its potential "to serve as an equivalent form of civic education and political stimulation." In our data, we do not detect changes in political knowledge amongst the population when moving from a voluntary to a compulsory voting system. A general observation, also in our sample, is that (voluntary) voters are more informed than non-voters (Palfrey and Poole, 1987). The direct implication of our results is that the electorate under full and forced democracy is likely to be less informed than a self-selected electorate, possibly having direct e¤ects on election outcomes (Leon 2013 , Bartels 1996 Notes: Entries are IV regressions results from a age polynomial fully interacted with a dummy for age 18 or older, school fixed effects and an indicator for whether the respondent voted before. Demographics include mother education, race and gender. Huber White standard errors are in brackets. In italic is the mean dependent variable for younger than 18. ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
